Personal Security Devices For | |
Protecting Legacy | |
Mobile Medical Devices |
Millions of people use mobile medical devices - more every day. But our
understanding of device security and privacy for such devices is incomplete.
Many forms of attacks on existing devices have been demonstrated, and surely
more remain to be discovered. Such attacks can compromise the privacy and
safety of patients. Ideally, such devices should be designed to high safety
standards, but unfortunately many medical devices making use of wireless networks
and other computing and communications capabilties are already in use.
Frequently, such devices have poor security built in, and often little or no
ability to perform upgrades to their software. Something must be done to
protect such devices.
Further, experience has shown that almost all deployed software will have some
security problems. Often it has proven difficult to get good patches to
remedy such problems, resulting in yet more deployed devices that have known
vulnerabilities. In some cases, the nature of a medical device makes alteration
of its internal software risky, even if it theoretically has the capability of
installing updates. Consider a pacemaker embedded in a patient's chest, for
example. Halting the device to install a new update may be inadvisable.
In response to these difficulties, we are investigating another approach to
provide a higher degree of security for legacy devices that cannot be easily
upgraded to fix their security problems and for devices that, for whatever
reasons, cannot be readily patched. This approach involves the use of a
separate stand-alone device that tries to remedy the security flaws of other
devices. We call this device a Personal Security Device, or PSD. The PSD
is intended to be a light, portable, battery-powered device that patients can
easily carry with them. It will be aware of the array of mobile medical devices
the patient uses and will have built-in understanding of the characteristics
and problems of those devices. The PSD will have the ability to observe
wireless interactions involving the medical devices and will be able to signal
possible attacks and often take remedial actions to limit or counteract such
attacks.
We are currently developing prototype versions of the PSD. An initial prototype
was built on a laptop computer, while a second prototype used an Android smart
phone. We are in the process of building a PSD prototype that is closer to
the original vision of the project. Here is a picture of the prototype, which is based around an Arduino microcontroller.
We are also working on investigations of
security flaws in commonly used medical devices and defense approaches that
the PSD could use to remedy those flaws.
Examples of legacy wireless medical devices we have worked with include:
As part of this project, we did a
survey of wireless medical devices on the
market, concentrating on security-related aspects of the devices. This survey
was done in 2012.
We implemented the PSD using an Arduino controller as a base device. Here is a description of the basic Arduino PSD device. Here
is a report on running AES on the
PSD Arduino.
The project is jointly led by
Dr.
Peter Reiher, an adjunct professor at UCLA
and
Dr.
Majid Sarrafzadeh, a professor in the Computer Science Department at
UCLA and head of the UCLA Wireless Health Institute.
This project is funded by the National Science Foundation grant CNS-1116371.
Publications related to this grant include:
Securing Legacy Mobile Medical Devices, Vahab Pournaghshband, Majid
Sarrafzadeh, and Peter Reiher, Mobihealth 2012. [Slides]
Adrasteia: A Smartphone App for Securing Legacy Mobile Medical Devices, Vahab Pournaghshband,
David Meyer, Michael Holyland, Majid Sarrafzadeh, and Peter Reiher, to appear in the IEEE
Workshop on Usable Mobile Security, December 2014.
For further information contact reiher@lasr.cs.ucla.edu
Last modified: December 3, 2014