

# Security for Operating Systems

## Introduction

Security of computing systems is a vital topic whose importance only keeps increasing. Much money has been lost and many people's lives have been harmed when computer security has failed. Attacks on computer systems are so common as to be inevitable in almost any scenario where you perform computing. Generally, all elements of a computer system can be subject to attack, and flaws in any of them can give an attacker an opportunity to do something you want to prevent. But operating systems are particularly important from a security perspective. Why?

To begin with, pretty much everything runs on top of an operating system. As a rule, if the software you are running on top of, whether it be an operating system, a piece of middleware, or something else, is insecure, what's above it is going to also be insecure. It's like building a house on sand. You may build a nice solid structure, but a flood can still wash away the base underneath your home, totally destroying it despite the care you took in its construction. Similarly, your application might perhaps have no security flaws of its own, but if the attacker can misuse the software underneath you to steal your information, crash your program, or otherwise cause you harm, your own efforts to secure your code might be for naught.

This point is especially important for operating systems. You might not care about the security of a particular web server or database system if you don't run that software, and you might not care about the security of some middleware platform that you don't use, but everyone runs an operating system. Thus, security flaws in an operating system, especially a widely used one, have an immense impact on many users and many pieces of software.

Another reason that operating system security is so important is that ultimately all of our software relies on proper behavior of the underlying hardware: the processor, the memory, and the peripheral devices. What has ultimate control of those hardware resources? The operating system. It can make your memory readable or writable by another process, it can starve you of cycles, it can corrupt the messages you send via your network card, it can wipe data off your disk, or do pretty much anything else with the hardware you rely on. You trust the operating system not to do any of those things, but your trust relies on the assumption that the OS contains no flaws that will allow an attacker to make it misbehave.

Thinking about what you have already studied concerning memory management, scheduling, file systems, synchronization, and so forth, what would happen with each of these components of your operating system if an opponent could force it to behave in some arbitrarily bad way? If you understand what you've learned so far, you should find this prospect deeply disturbing. Our computing lives depend on our operating systems behaving as they have been defined to behave, and particularly on them not behaving in ways that benefit our opponents, rather than us.

The task of securing an operating system is not an easy one, since modern operating systems are large and complex. Your experience in writing code should have already pointed out to you that the more code you've got, and the more complex the algorithms are, the more likely your code is to contain flaws. Failures in software security generally arise from these kinds of flaws. So large, complex programs are likely to be harder to secure than small, simple programs. Not many other programs are as large and complex as a modern operating system.

Another challenge in securing operating systems is that they are, for the most part, meant to support multiple processes simultaneously. As you've learned, there are many mechanisms in an operating system meant to segregate processes from each other, and to protect shared pieces of hardware from being used in ways that interfere with other processes. If we fully trusted every process running on our machine to do anything it wants with any hardware resource and any piece of data on the machine, securing the system would be a lot easier. However, we typically don't trust everything equally. When you download and run a script from a web site you haven't visited before, do you really want it to be able to wipe every file from your disk, kill all your other processes, and start using your network interface to send spam email to other machines? Probably not, but if you are the owner of your computer, you have the right to do all those things, if that's what you want to do. And unless the operating system is careful, any process it runs, including the one running that script you downloaded, can do anything you can do.

Consider the issue of operating system security from a different perspective. One role of an operating system is to provide useful abstractions for application programs to build on. These applications must rely on the OS implementations of the abstractions to work as they are defined. Often, one part of the definition of such abstractions is their security behavior. For example, we expect that the operating system's file system will enforce the access restrictions it is supposed to enforce. Applications can then build on this expectation to achieve the security goals they require, such as counting on the file system access guarantees to ensure that a file they have specified as unwritable does not get altered. If the applications cannot rely on proper implementation of OS abstraction security guarantees, then they cannot use these abstractions to achieve their own security goals. At the minimum, that implies a great deal more work on the part of the application developers, since they will need to take extra measures to achieve their desired security goals. Taking into account our earlier discussion, they will often be unable to achieve these goals if the abstractions they must rely on (such as virtual memory and a well-defined scheduling policy) cannot be trusted.

### THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM HOW CAN WE SECURE OS RESOURCES?

In the face of multiple possibly concurrent and interacting processes running on the same machine, how can we ensure that the resources each process is permitted to access are exactly those it should access, in exactly the ways we desire? What primitives are needed from the OS? What mechanisms should be provided by the hardware? How can we use them to solve the problems of security?

Obviously operating system security is vital, yet hard to achieve. So what do we do to secure our operating system? Addressing that question has been a challenge for generations of computer scientists, and there is as yet no complete answer. But there are some important principles and tools we can use to secure operating systems. These are generally built into any general-purpose operating system you are likely to work with, and they alter what can be done with that system and how you go about doing it. So even if you don't personally care at all about security, understanding what your OS does to secure itself is necessary to understand how to get the system to do what you want.

## What Are We Protecting?

We aren't likely to achieve good protection unless we have a fairly comprehensive view of what we're trying to protect when we say our operating system should be secure. Fortunately, that question is easy to answer for an operating system, at least at the high level: everything. That answer isn't very comforting, but it is best to have a realistic understanding of the broad implications of operating system security.

A typical commodity operating system has complete control of all hardware on the machine and is able to do literally anything the hardware permits. That means it can control the processor, read and write all registers, examine any main memory location, and perform any operation one of its peripherals supports. As a result, among the things the OS can do are:

- examine or alter any process' memory
- read, write, delete or corrupt any file on any writeable persistent storage medium, including hard disks and flash drives
- change the scheduling or even halt execution of any process
- send any message to anywhere, including altered versions of those a process wished to send
- enable or disable any peripheral device
- give any process access to any other process' resources
- arbitrarily take away any resource a process controls
- respond to any system call with a maximally harmful lie

In essence, processes are at the mercy of the operating system. It is nearly impossible for a process to "protect" any part of itself from a malicious operating system. We typically assume our operating system is not actually malicious<sup>1</sup>, but a flaw that allows a malicious process to cause the operating system to misbehave is nearly as bad, since it could potentially allow that process to gain any of the powers of the operating system itself.

This point should make you think very seriously about the importance of designing secure operating systems and, more commonly, applying security patches to any operating system you are running. Security flaws in your operating system can

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<sup>1</sup> If you suspect your operating system is malicious, it's time to get a new operating system.

completely compromise everything about the machine the system runs on, so preventing them and patching any that are found is vitally important.

## Security Goals and Policies

What do we mean when we say we want an operating system, or any system, to be secure? That's a rather vague statement. What we really mean is that there are things we would like to happen in the system and things we don't want to happen, and we'd like a high degree of assurance that we get what we want. As in most other aspects of life, we usually end up paying for what we get, so it's worthwhile to think about exactly what security properties and effects we actually need and then pay only for those, not for other things we don't need. What this boils down to is that we want to specify the goals we have for the security-relevant behavior of our system and choose defense approaches likely to achieve those goals at a reasonable cost.

Researchers in security have thought about this issue in broad terms for a long time. At a high conceptual level, they have defined three big security-related goals that are common to many systems, including operating systems. They are:

- *Confidentiality* – Keep your secrets. If some piece of information is supposed to be hidden from others, don't allow them to find it out. For example, you don't want someone to learn what your credit card number is – you want that number kept confidential.
- *Integrity* – If some piece of information or component of a system is supposed to be in a particular state, don't allow an opponent to change it. For example, if you've placed an online order for delivery of one pepperoni pizza, you don't want a malicious prankster to change your order to 1000 anchovy pizzas.
- *Availability* – If some information or service is supposed to be available for your own or others' use, make sure an attacker cannot prevent its use. For example, if your business is having a big sale, you don't want your competitors to be able to block off the streets around your store, preventing your customers from reaching you.

These are big, general goals. For a real system, you need to drill down to more detailed, specific goals. In a typical operating system, for example, we might have a confidentiality goal stating that a process' memory space cannot be arbitrarily read by another process. We might have an integrity goal stating that if a user writes a record to a particular file, another user who should not be able to write that file can't change the record. We might have an availability goal stating that one process running on the system cannot hog the CPU and prevent other processes from getting their share of the CPU. If you think back on what you've learned about the process abstraction, memory management, scheduling, file systems, IPC, and other topics from this class, you should be able to think of some other obvious confidentiality, integrity, and availability goals we are likely to want in our operating systems.

For any particular system, even goals at this level are not sufficiently specific. The integrity goal alluded to above, where a user's file should not be overwritten by another

user not permitted to do so, gives you a hint about the extra specificity we need in our security goals for a particular system. Maybe there is some user who should be able to overwrite the file, as might be the case when two people are collaborating on writing a report. But that doesn't mean an unrelated third user should be able to write that file, if he is not collaborating on the report stored there. We need to be able to specify such detail in our security goals. Operating systems are written to be used by many different people with many different needs, and operating system security should reflect that generality. What we want in security mechanisms for operating systems is flexibility in describing our detailed security goals.

#### ASIDE: SECURITY VS. FAULT TOLERANCE

When discussing the process abstraction, we talked about how virtualization protected a process from actions of other processes. For instance, we did not want our process' memory to be accidentally overwritten by another process, so our virtualization mechanisms had to prevent such behavior. Then we were talking primarily about flaws or mistakes in processes. Is this actually any different than worrying about malicious behavior, which is more commonly the context in which we discuss security? Have we already solved all our problems by virtualizing our resources?

Yes and no. (Isn't that a helpful phrase?) Yes, if we perfectly virtualized everything and allowed no interactions between anything, we very likely would have solved most problems of malice. However, most virtualization mechanisms are not totally bulletproof. They work well when no one tries to subvert them, but may not be perfect against all possible forms of misbehavior. Second, and perhaps more important, we don't totally isolate processes from each other. Processes share some OS resources by default (such as file systems) and can optionally choose to share others. These intentional relaxations of virtualization are not problematic when used properly, but they are also potential channels for malicious attacks. Finally, the OS does not always have complete control of the hardware . . .

Ultimately, of course, the operating system software must do its best to enforce those flexible security goals, which implies we'll need to encode those goals in forms that software can understand. We typically must convert our vague understandings of our security goals into very specific security *policies*. For example, in the case of the file described above, we might want to specify a policy like "users A and B may write to file X, but no other user can write it." With that degree of specificity, backed by carefully designed and implemented mechanisms, we can hope to achieve our security goals<sup>2</sup>.

Note an important implication for operating system security: in many cases, an operating system will have the mechanisms necessary to implement a desired security policy with a high degree of assurance in its proper application, but only if someone tells the operating

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<sup>2</sup> Yet another example of the operating system using general mechanisms to implement flexible policies.

system precisely what that policy is. With some important exceptions (like maintaining a process' address space private unless specifically directed otherwise), the operating system merely supplies general mechanisms that can implement many specific policies. Without intelligent design of policies and careful application of the mechanisms, however, what the operating system can do may not be what your operating system will do.

## Designing Secure Systems

Few of you will ever build your own operating system, nor even make serious changes to any existing operating system, but we expect many of you will build large software systems of some kind. Experience of many computer scientists with system design has shown that there are certain design principles that are helpful in building systems with security requirements. These principles were originally laid out by Jerome Saltzer and Michael Schroeder in an influential paper [SS75], though some of them come from earlier observations by others. While neither the original authors nor later commentators would claim that following them will guarantee that your system is secure, paying attention to them has proven to lead to more secure systems, while you ignore them at your own peril. We'll discuss them briefly here. If you are actually building a large software system, it would be worth your while to look up this paper (or more detailed commentaries on it) and study the concepts more carefully.

1. Economy of mechanism – This basically means keep your system as small and simple as possible. Simple systems have fewer bugs and it's easier to understand their behavior. If you don't understand your system's behavior, you're not likely to know if it achieves security goals.
2. Fail safe defaults – Default to security, not insecurity. If policies can be set to determine the behavior of a system, have the default for those policies be more secure, not less.
3. Complete mediation – This is a security term meaning that you should check if an action to be performed meets security policies every single time the action is taken<sup>3</sup>.
4. Open design – Assume your opponent knows every detail of your design. If the system can achieve its security goals anyway, you're in good shape. This principle does not necessarily mean that you actually tell everyone all the details, but base your security on the assumption that the attacker has learned everything. He often has, in practice.
5. Separation of privilege – Require separate parties or credentials to perform critical actions. For example, two-factor authentication, where you use both a password and possession of a piece of hardware to determine identity, is more secure than using either one of those methods alone.

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<sup>3</sup> This particular principle is often ignored in many systems, in favor of lower overhead or usability. An overriding characteristic of all engineering design is that you often must balance conflicting goals, as we saw earlier in the course, such as in the scheduling chapters. We'll say more about that in the context of security later.

6. Least privilege – Give a user or a process the minimum privileges required to perform the actions you wish to allow. The more privileges you give to a party, the greater the danger that they will abuse those privileges. Even if you are confident that the party is not malicious, if they make a mistake, an adversary can leverage their error to use their superfluous privileges in harmful ways.
7. Least common mechanism – For different users or processes, use separate data structures or mechanisms to handle them. For example, each process gets its own page table in a virtual memory system, ensuring that one process cannot access another's pages.
8. Acceptability – A critical property not dear to the hearts of many programmers. If your users won't use it, your system is worthless. Far too many promising secure systems have been abandoned because they asked too much of their users.

These are not the only useful pieces of advice on designing secure systems out there. There is also lots of good material on taking the next step, converting a good design into code that achieves the security you intended, and other material on how to evaluate whether the system you have built does indeed meet those goals. These issues are beyond the scope of this course, but are extremely important when the time comes for you to build large, complex systems. For discussion of approaches to secure programming, you might start with [SE13], if you are working in C. If you are working in another language, you should seek out a similar text specific to that language, since many secure coding problems are related to specifics of the language. For a comprehensive treatment on how to evaluate if your system is secure, start with [D+07]

## **The Basics of OS Security**

In a typical operating system, then, we have some set of security goals, centered around various aspects of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Some of these goals tend to be built in to the operating system model, while others are controlled by the owners or users of the system. The built-in goals are those that are extremely common, or must be ensured to make the more specific goals achievable. Most of these built-in goals relate to controlling process access to pieces of the hardware. That's because the hardware is shared by all the processes on a system, and unless the sharing is carefully controlled, one process can interfere with the security goals of another process. Other built-in goals relate to services that the operating system offers, such as file systems, memory management, and interprocess communications. If these services are not carefully controlled, processes can subvert the system's security goals.

Clearly, a lot of system security is going to be related to process handling. If the operating system can maintain a clean separation of processes that can only be broken with the operating system's help, then neither shared hardware nor operating system services can be used to subvert our security goals. That requirement implies that the operating system needs to be careful about allowing use of hardware and of its services. In many cases, the operating system has good opportunities to apply such caution. For example, the operating system controls virtual memory, which in turn completely controls which main memory addresses each process can access. Hardware support

prevents a process from even naming a physical memory address that is not mapped into its virtual memory space.

System calls offer the operating system another opportunity to provide protection. In most operating systems, processes access system services by making an explicit system call, as was discussed in earlier chapters. As you have learned, system calls switch the execution mode from the processor's user mode to its supervisor mode, invoking an appropriate piece of operating system code as they do so. That code can determine which process made the system call and what service the process requested. Earlier, we only talked about how this could allow the operating system to call the proper piece of system code to perform the service, and to keep track of who to return control to when the service had been completed. But the same mechanism gives the operating system the opportunity to check if the requested service should be allowed under the system's security policy. Since access to peripheral devices is through device drivers, which are usually also accessed via system call, the same mechanism can ensure proper application of security policies for hardware access.

When a process performs a system call, then, the operating system will use the process identifier in the process control block or similar structure to determine the identity of the process. The OS can then use *access control mechanisms* to decide if the identified process is *authorized* to perform the requested action. If so, the OS either performs the action itself on behalf of the process or arranges for the process to perform it without further system intervention. If the process is not authorized, the OS can simply generate an error code for the system call and return control to the process, if the scheduling algorithm permits.

#### TIP: THE WEAKEST LINK

It's worthwhile to remember that the people attacking your systems share many characteristics with you. In particular, they're probably pretty smart and they probably are kind of lazy, in the positive sense that they don't do work that they don't need to do. That implies that attackers tend to go for the easiest possible way to overcome your system's security. They're not going to search for a zero-day buffer overflow if you've chosen "password" as your password to access the system.

The practical implication for you is that you should spend most of the time you devote to securing your system to identifying and strengthening your weakest link. Your weakest link is the least protected part of your system, the one that's easiest to attack, the one you can't hide away or augment with some external security system. Often, a running system's weakest link is actually its human users, not its software. You will have a hard time changing the behavior of people, but you can design the software bearing in mind that attackers may try to fool the legitimate users into misusing it. Remember that principle of least privilege? If an attacker can fool a user who has complete privileges into misusing the system, it will be a lot worse than fooling a user who can only damage his own assets.



## Summary

The security of the operating system is vital for both its own and its applications' sakes. Security failures in this software allow essentially limitless bad consequences. While achieving system security is challenging, there are known design principles that can help. These principles are useful not only in designing operating systems, but in designing any large software system.

Achieving security in operating systems depends on the security goals one has. These goals will typically include goals related to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In any given system, the more detailed particulars of these security goals vary, which implies that different systems will have different security policies intended to help them meet their specific security goals. As in other areas of operating system design, we handle these varying needs by separating the specific policies used by any particular system from the general mechanisms used to implement the policies by all systems.

The next question to address is, what mechanisms should our operating system contain to help us support general security policies? The virtualization of processes and memory is one helpful mechanism, since it allows us to control the behavior of processes to a large extent. We will describe several other useful operating system security mechanisms in the upcoming chapters.

## References

[D+07] “The Art of Software Security Assessment”

Mark Dowd, John McDonald, and Justin Schuh

Addison-Wesley, 2007.

*A long, comprehensive treatment of how to determine if your software system meets its security goals. It also contains useful advice on avoiding security problems in coding.*

[SE13] “Secure Coding in C and C++”

Robert Seacord

Addison-Wesley, 2013.

*A well regarded book on how to avoid major security mistakes in coding in C.*

[SS75] “The Protection of Information in Computer Systems”

Jerome Saltzer and Michael Schroeder

Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 63, No. 9, September 1975.

*A highly influential paper, particularly their codification of principles for secure system design.*